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INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING NEW 
REMEDIES THROUGH APPLICATION OF THE 
HAGUE CONVENTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Family law issues that were once exclusively resolved within the 
national arena are now demanding international application.1 Marriages 
and families have been traditionally local in character, but as international 
relationships and marriages increase, so do international divorces and 
custody disputes.2 Family law is laden with cultural values and 
presumptions about gender roles and what is best for children.3 In Islamic 
law, for instance, fathers and mothers have different preordained roles in 
their children’s lives than in Western cultures.4 In Mexico, mothers are the 
presumptive best caretakers for young children.5 In addition to cultural 
standards infiltrating family law is the infusion of nationalism, which may 
create a subconscious presumption in favor of the decision-maker’s home 
country.6 
 1. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 2 (1999).  
 2. See id. 
 3. Thomas Foley, Note, Extending Comity to Foreign Decrees in International Custody 
Disputes Between Parents in the United States and Islamic Nations, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 257, 258 
(2003). 
The legal institutions of various cultures around the world define the best interests of a child 
differently. The religious and social values of a society dictate the answers to legal questions 
of custody, parental authority, upbringing, permissible social behavior of minors, and degrees 
of freedom . . . U.S. custody law, which focuses on the needs of the child and each parent’s 
ability and willingness to meet those needs . . . [is distinguished from] custody law in Islamic 
nations, where social and religious values of Islam answer questions of parental authority and 
fitness. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 4. Id. at 260–61. 
Even though the father has ultimate legal custody of his children, it is lawful that the mother 
has physical custody during their “years of dependency,” which last until the age of seven for 
boys and nine for girls. After this point, the child starts his or her spiritual upbringing under 
the guardianship of the father . . .  
Id. (internal citations omitted). It is important to note, however, that “[a]part from Burkina Faso, no 
Muslim nation has ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention.” Id. at 261. Therefore, specific issues 
posed to international custody disputes between Western democracies and Islamic nations are beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
 5. Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 456 (1st Cir. 2000). “Mexican law [has a] preference in 
divorce cases toward placing what is called ‘custody’ of a child under age seven with the mother.” Id. 
 6. See Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, in 3 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p415 Lubin note book pages.doc4/26/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
416 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:415 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Familial decisions, such as where to live and raise children, are 
generally retained in the family unit. Ideas of family autonomy generate 
state deference in child-rearing decisions, and parents are presumed to 
represent their child’s best interests.7 When family units break down, 
however, deciding where children will be raised is a choice wrought with 
competing interests. Rather than a unified familial interest, each person’s 
interest is conceptualized as being independent once the marital 
relationship breaks down. 
Within the context of deteriorating family relationships is the 
possibility of parents abducting their own children. Parental abduction is 
recognized as a much different phenomenon than stranger kidnapping, in 
that it is often fueled by distinct motivations.8 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction 
(Hague Convention)9 was drafted in 1980 to combat the perceived 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIEME SESSION 426 (1982) [hereinafter 
Pérez-Vera Report]. On this point, the Pérez-Vera Report notes: 
It can happen that such a decision is the most just, but we cannot ignor (sic) the fact that 
recourse by internal authorities to such a notion involves the risk of their expressing particular 
cultural, social etc. attitudes which themselves derive from a given national community and 
thus basically imposing their own subjective value judgments upon the national community 
from which the child has recently been snatched. 
Id. ¶ 22. The significance of the Pérez-Vera report is described as being an: 
 . . . Explanatory Report on a text which is destined to become positive law, that is to say a 
text which will require to be cited and applied, must fulfil (sic) at least two essential aims. On 
the one hand, it must throw into relief, as accurately as possible, the principles which form the 
basis of the Convention and, wherever necessary, the development of those ideas which led to 
such principles being chosen from amongst existing options.  
Id. ¶ 5. 
 7. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (recognizing the right to family autonomy in the 
United States). 
 8. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 13. The Pérez-Vera Report distinguishes stranger 
kidnappings as: 
[T]he person who removes the child . . . hopes to obtain a right of custody from the 
authorities of the country to which the child has been taken. The problem therefore concerns a 
person who, broadly speaking, belongs to the family circle of the child; indeed, in the 
majority of cases, the person concerned is the father or mother. 
Id. ¶ 13. 
 9. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened for 
signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983) 
[hereinafter Hague Convention]. As of August 2004, there are seventy-five Contracting States to the 
Convention. Status Table of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (Aug. 2004), at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2004). See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 37 (noting that the scope of the 
Convention “is designed to regulate only those situations that come within its scope and which involve 
two or more Contracting States . . . [T]he applicability of the Convention’s benefits will itself depend 
on the concept of reciprocity which in principle excludes it being extended to nationals of third 
countries”). In the United States, the implementing legislation is the International Child Abduction 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/8
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problem of nonprimary caretakers internationally abducting their 
children.10 The drafters of the Hague Convention viewed non-primary 
caretaker abduction as especially harmful to children,11 and, as a result, 
undergirding the Hague Convention is the assumption that abducted 
children are removed from a place that they consider “home,” and taken 
somewhere to which they are not similarly acclimated.12 The drafters 
sought to minimize potential harm to the child and to the child’s 
relationship with the primary caregiver.13 The Hague Convention focuses 
on protecting children from abduction which, in itself, was viewed as 
harmful to children14 and adopted the dual approach of creating a 
disincentive for would-be abductors, while remedying abductions as 
swiftly as possible.15 
The Hague Convention is premised on presumptions about parental 
abductors that are proving to be inaccurate. In fact, contrary to the non-
primary caretaker abductions that were envisioned, the majority of cases 
having relevance to the Hague Convention today arise when primary 
caretakers abduct their own children.16 The well-intentioned Hague 
Convention, meanwhile, focuses myopically on non-primary caretaker 
abductions. Although there should not be a primary caretaker exception to 
Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11610 (1994) [hereinafter ICARA].  
 10. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 3. 
 11. Id. at 8–9. 
 12. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 12 (describing the outcome from a child being 
abducted internationally, “the child is taken out of the family and social environment in which its life 
has developed”). 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id. 
The struggle against the great increase in international child abductions must always be 
inspired by the desire to protect children and should be based upon an interpretation of their 
true interests. Now, the right not to be removed or retained in the name of more or less 
arguable rights concerning its person is one of the most objective examples of what 
constitutes the interests of the child. 
Id. ¶ 24. 
 15. See Press Release, Fourth Special Commission Meeting, Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, A Child has a Fundamental Right to Maintain Contact with Both Parents (Mar. 
2001), at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=2264&zoek=press%20 
release (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Hague Conference Press Release]. 
 16. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 10.  
Several explanations might be put forward which could help account for this apparently 
dramatic transformation in the typical profile of an abducting parent from non-custodial father 
to a custodian who is very often the mother . . . Recent years have seen a more inclusive 
approach being taken with regard to the roles played by parents in the aftermath of a failed 
marriage or relationship . . . . It remains to be seen whether the original stereotype might be 
confirmed in relation to Contracting States which for religious or other reasons embody a 
principle of patriarchal pre-eminence.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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the Hague Convention’s application, unintended effects of the convention 
must be addressed as application of the Hague Convention produces a 
negative and disparate impact on women. One example is in the context of 
career-motivated international relocation. International relocation by 
families is highly correlated with the husband’s career;17 however, 
application of the convention may make it impossible for the woman to 
leave the new country lawfully with her children.18 A second example of a 
negative disparate impact affecting women is in the context of victims of 
domestic violence fleeing internationally with their children, a scenario the 
convention does not seem to take into account.19 The combination of 
highly gender-correlated factors in the application of the current Hague 
Convention creates a disparate impact that disadvantages women. Primary 
caretaker abductions do not necessarily cause the same detriment to 
children.20 Returning the child to the place from which she was abducted 
may, in fact, be in the child’s worst interest where return entails separation 
from the primary caretaker.21 Women often abduct for their own safety, 
and returning the child may be contrary to the child’s interest as well as 
public policy.22  
It is imperative that the Hague Convention remain current to address 
today’s trends rather than yesterday’s presumptions. Because the 
underlying aim of the convention is to protect children and their most 
crucial emotional attachments, certain adjustments are needed to best 
provide for that aim and promote just outcomes upon application of the 
convention. 
In Part I, this Note discusses the pre-convention difficulty in applying 
the “child’s best interests” standard to international disputes. This Note 
then discusses how the lack of a uniform legal standard prompted the 
drafters to remove the forum-shopping incentive from parental abduction. 
In Part II, this Note explains the underlying aims and goals of the 
 17. Annual Transferee Demographic Survey, 17 RUNZHEIMER REPORTS ON RELOCATION 1–2, 
May 1998. 
 18. See infra notes 115–31 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 132–47 and accompanying text. 
 20. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 11. “It might also be suggested that if the 
abductor exercises the primary parenting role in the relationship it will, in his or her view, be entirely 
natural to leave with the children.” Id. 
 21. See id. at 7–13 (discussing the differences experienced by children depending on whether 
they are abducted by their primary caretaker or by someone else). 
 22. See Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of Transnational Litigation for 
Feminists Concerned about domestic Violence Here and Abroad, 11 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 
765 (2003). “Published figures indicate that seventy percent of the abductors are now mothers, 
typically the child’s primary caretaker. Often these mothers are victims of domestic violence, and they 
are fleeing transnationally with their children in order to escape . . .” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/8
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Convention and how they are applied. Part III provides analysis of the 
Hague gender-based disparate impact that results from the convention. 
Tension exists between keeping the Hague Convention intact and making 
changes to alleviate its negative impact on women. Part III also presents 
two proposals. The first proposal evaluates habitual residence from a 
holistic view of the child’s life rather than from the time immediately 
preceding the abduction. The second proposal excepts international 
abductions in an attempt to escape domestic violence from operation of the 
summary return mechanism. Finally, this Note reiterates the pressing need 
to reform the Hague Convention in order to actualize the important goal of 
protecting children while not hurting women. 
I. PRE-CONVENTION APPLICATION OF THE “CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS” 
Prior to the Hague Convention, no uniform international legal standard 
existed for resolving cases of alleged wrongful removal23 and 
internationally dispossessed parents frequently faced insurmountable 
hurdles to having their children returned.24 International law was ill-
equipped to deal with parental child abduction, leaving many dispossessed 
parents without a remedy.25 The legal standard often employed was 
 23. Hague Convention, supra note 9, pmbl. The Hague Convention provides a legal standard for 
wrongful removal as follows: 
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where: a) It is in breach 
of rights of custody attributed to a person . . . under the law of the State in which the child 
was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b) At the time of 
removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would 
have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. 
Id. art. 3. See also 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,503 (Mar. 26, 1986). “Generally speaking, ‘wrongful 
removal’ refers to the taking of a child from the person who was actually exercising custody of the 
child. ‘Wrongful retention’ refers to the act of keeping the child without the consent of the person who 
was actually exercising custody.” Id. 
 24. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 3. 
First, the child had to be located; then, faced with a “legal kidnapping,” courts were in most 
instances unwilling to take any action without first investigating what was in the individual 
child’s best interests. This inevitably led to lengthy, drawn-out proceedings and, although 
their aim was to find the most appropriate solution for the child, the greater the period of time 
which elapsed the less likely that the child would in fact benefit from being returned. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 25. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 68. The report notes: 
[I]n terms of statistics, the number of cases in which a child is removed prior to a decision on 
its custody are quite frequent. [T]he possibility of the dispossessed parent being able to 
recover the child in such circumstances, except within the Convention’s framework, is 
practically non-existent, unless he in his turn resorts to force, a course of action which is 
always harmful to the child. 
Id. 
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referred to as the “child’s best interest,”26 which is arguably tied to 
subjective, culturally biased judgments.27 No global consensus exists, as 
notions differ regarding the degree of autonomy and self-determination a 
child should be afforded.28 Further, the differing ways of conceptualizing 
children’s rights evoke disparate responses.29 As a result, the child’s best 
interest approach is the subject of much criticism.30 
The drafters of the Hague Convention felt the subjective child’s best 
interest approach offered forum-shopping incentives to abductors.31 The 
perceived problem arose when an abductor wrongfully removed a child to 
a different forum and, once there, attained the court’s jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the custody dispute. The drafters viewed such jurisdiction as 
false in that the child had no ties to the country other than as an abduction 
destination.32 Further, where jurisdiction is “false,” the child’s best interest 
approach, infused with cultural bias, often resulted in the resolution of the 
custody dispute in favor of the abducting parent.33 “[C]ourts tended to rule 
that the child’s country of habitual residence was altered by the abduction, 
making the country to which the child had been abducted the child’s 
habitual residence.”34 The drafters sought to set a uniform standard that 
 26. See id. ¶ 22. “[I]t must not be forgotten that it is by invoking ‘the best interests of the child’ 
that internal jurisdictions have in the past often finally awarded the custody in question to the person 
who wrongfully removed or retained the child.” Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. ¶ 24, citing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 31st Ordinary 
Session, Recommendation 874 on a European Charter on the Rights of the Child (Oct. 4, 1979), at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta79/BREC874.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
“Children must no longer be regarded as parents’ property, but must be recognised [sic] as individuals 
with their own rights and needs.” Id. at 3. 
 29. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 21. 
 30. See id. 
[T]he legal standard “the best interests of the child” is at first view of such vagueness that it 
seems to resemble more closely a sociological paradigm than a concrete juridical standard. 
How can one put flesh on its bare bones without delving into the assumptions concerning the 
ultimate interests of a child which are derived from the moral framework of a particular 
culture? The word “ultimate” gives rise to immediate problems when it is inserted into the 
equation since the general statement of the standard does not make it clear whether the 
“interests” of the child to be served are those of the immediate aftermath of the decision, of 
the adolescence of the child, of young adulthood, maturity, senescence or old age. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 31. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 14 (describing wrongfully disposed parent’s 
disadvantage, even when proceedings were initiated in a timely fashion). “[T]he abductor will hold the 
advantage, since it is he who has chosen the forum in which the case is to be decided, a forum which, 
in principle, he regards as more favourable [sic] to his own claims.” Id. 
 32. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 11. 
 33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 34. Laura C. Clemens, Note, International Parental Child Abduction: Time for the United States 
to Take a Stand, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 151, 155 (2003). 
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would be in the children’s collective best interests by removing this 
forum-shopping incentive for abductors. Thus, the subjective case-by-case 
analysis of the child’s best interest standard largely abrogated.35 Replacing 
the manipulable “child’s best interest” standard is the Hague Convention’s 
inflexible denial of jurisdiction in the abducted-to country to so much as 
hear the merits of the underlying custody dispute, unless one of the very 
narrow exceptions applies. 
II. THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND ITS APPLICATION 
A. The Goals of the Hague Convention 
International child abduction, for purposes of private international law, 
is defined as the “unilateral removal or retention of children by parents, 
guardians or close family members.”36 It is a distinctly different problem 
than kidnapping by a stranger,37 and perceived abductors were typically 
non-custodial/non-primary caretaker parents.38 The stereotypical scenario 
envisioned at the time the Hague Convention was ratified paints a picture 
of an estranged father removing his child to another country, with the 
mother and child terribly distraught until the status quo ante is restored.39 
Undergirding the convention is the assumption that the abducted child 
removed from a place that she considers “home,” and taken somewhere 
that she is not similarly acclimated.40 
 35. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 13 (noting the conceptual change from the 
individual child’s best interests, to the best interests of children as a whole). 
 36. Saniya O’Brien, The Trials and Tribulations of Implementing the Hague Convention on 
International Child Abduction: Improving Dispute Resolution and Enforcement of Parental Rights in 
International Arena, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 197, 197 (2003) (internal citation to BEAUMONT & 
MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 1). 
 37. Id. 
 38. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 3. “When work began on the Child Abduction 
Convention it was commonly perceived that parental abductions were perpetrated by fathers 
dissatisfied with an access award they had or were about to receive in a divorce settlement.” Id. 
 39. Id. at 9. 
Indeed, it has been recognized by Adair Dyer, former Deputy Secretary General of the Hague 
Conference, that in the 1970s when the Convention was being prepared the paradigm case 
was that of the father who became so frustrated with being denied access to his child or 
children after the court had granted sole custody to the mother, that he stole the child, went 
abroad, and then underground.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 40. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 12 (describing the outcome from a child being 
abducted internationally). “[T]he child is taken out of the family and social environment in which its 
life has developed.” Id. 
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The two related goals of the Hague Convention were to create 
disincentives to international parental child abduction and to return in a 
timely manner children who were wrongfully removed.41 The drafters 
sought to remove the forum-shopping incentive from would-be abductors 
by denying jurisdiction to hear the custody dispute in the abducted-to 
forum.42 Therefore, the Hague Convention specifically aims at remedying 
wrongful removals, and does not allow contracting States to hear the 
merits of the underlying custody dispute.43 The drafters thought removing 
the great differences in international legal systems was essential.44 Courts 
generally strive toward uniform global interpretation and application of the 
treaty and often look internationally for guiding precedent.45 The 
convention, therefore, strives to promote a uniform international standard 
of denying jurisdiction in abducted-to states in order to dissuade potential 
abductors and quickly remedy abductions that have already occurred. 
Seeking to protect children from the harmful effects of abduction, the 
drafters conceptualized a convention that would not only deter potential 
abductors, but would also provide an efficient remedy for past 
abductions.46 The drafters determined “[t]he principle underpinning the 
convention is that a child is legally entitled to be in contact with both 
parents.”47 The corollary of the child’s rights are the parents’ rights. 
Frequently, one parent has custody rights while the other has legally 
enforceable access rights.48 Although the Hague Convention ultimately 
 41. See id. ¶ 11 (recognizing “that the situations envisaged are those which derive from the use of 
force to establish artificial jurisdictional links on an international level, with a view to obtaining 
custody of a child”). 
 42. See id. ¶ 16. 
[S]ince one factor characteristic of the situations under consideration consists in the fact that 
the abductor claims that his action has been rendered lawful by the competent authorities of 
the State of refuge, one effective way of deterring him would be to deprive his actions of any 
practical or juridical consequences. 
Id. 
 43. See id. ¶ 19. “[T]he Convention rests implicitly upon the principle that any debate on the 
merits of the question, i.e. of custody rights, should take place before the competent authorities in the 
State where the child had its habitual residence prior to its removal . . .” Id. 
 44. Id. ¶ 22. 
 45. See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 221–22 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding in dictum “[A] court’s 
interpretation of a treaty will have consequences not only for the family immediately involved but also 
for the way in which other courts—both here and abroad—interpret the treaty”). 
 46. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 17 (stating that while the prompt return of the child 
answers to the desire to re-establish a situation unilaterally and forcibly altered by the abductor, 
effective respect for rights of custody and of access belongs on the preventive level, in so far as it must 
lead to the disappearance of one of the most frequent causes of child abductions”). 
 47. See Hague Conference Press Release, supra note 15. 
 48. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 26. 
[T]he rule concerning access rights also reflects the concern to provide children with family 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/8
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adopted access rights for non-custodial parents, it was noted that there is a 
school of thought that thinks it is not in the child’s best interest to remain 
in contact with both parents when they are separated.49 
B. How the Hague Convention Functions 
The drafters of the Hague Convention sought to remedy a specific type 
of parental abduction, specifically abduction by the non-custodial parent.50 
The international case law has demonstrated that, in actuality, it is 
frequently the primary caretaker who is the abductor.51 The case law 
portrays a different story than what was originally anticipated. It is 
frequently the primary caretaker (and often the mother) who wants: to 
return to her country of origin after a failed marriage; to escape an abusive 
situation; or to simply be close to her family while raising her children.52 
Therefore, a great number of the abductions falling under the convention 
are far removed from those hypothesized by its drafters. 
The Preamble of the Hague Convention makes the child’s right gainst 
being removed paramount.53 Included in this right are protections against 
being uprooted and replanted in a foreign country.54 
relationships which are as comprehensive as possible, so as to encourage the development of 
a stable personality. . . . [A]ccess rights are the natural counterpart of custody rights, a 
counterpart which must in principle be acknowledged as belonging to the parent who does not 
have custody of the child. 
Id. 
 49. Id. 
However, opinions differ on this, a fact which once again throws into relief the ambiguous 
nature of this principle of the interests of the child. In fact, there exists a school of thought 
opposed to the test which has been accepted by the Convention, which maintains that it is 
better for the child not to have contact with both parents where the couple are separated in 
law or in fact. 
Id. 
 50. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 51. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 9. “[I]n an overwhelming number of cases the 
abductor was vested with custody right over the child.” Id. 
 52. See id. at 3–4; see also Kerri Smetzer Mast, Note, The Application of the Fundamental 
Principles Exception of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 241, 245–46 (2003); Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between 
Uniformity and Progress: The Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 277–78 (2002) 
(considering solutions and implications of altering remedy of return in recognition of the actual 
demographics of abductors being primary caretakers).  
 53. Hague Convention, supra note 9, pmbl. The Preamble of the Hague Convention states: 
The struggle against the great increase in child abductions must always be inspired by the 
desire to protect children and should be based upon an interpretation of their true interests. 
Now, the right not to be removed or retained in the name of more or less arguable rights 
concerning its person is one of the most objective examples of what constitutes the interests 
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The drafters sought to protect children from abduction by eliminating 
forum-shopping incentives and restoring their pre-abduction status.55 To 
accomplish these aims, the drafters limited jurisdiction in countries to 
which abductors travel,56 allowing jurisdiction in the abducted-to country 
solely to adjudicate whether there was a wrongful removal.57 The 
abducted-to country does not have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the 
underlying custody dispute before determining whether the child was 
wrongfully removed from the alleged abducted-from country.58 If the child 
was wrongfully removed and the abduction is not subject to the limited 
exceptions, the abducted-to country’s court orders the child sent back to 
the abducted-from country; this process is known as the summary return 
mechanism.59 If the abduction is not wrongful, the summary return 
mechanism does not apply and jurisdiction is not denied by the Hague 
Convention.60 
C. Elements to Evaluate when Determining if the Summary Return 
Mechanism Applies 
In an action under the Hague Convention, the first step is to determine 
whether the child was wrongfully removed.61 In evaluating whether 
removal or retention of a child is wrongful,62 courts look to whether the 
of the child.  
Id. See also Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 25 (noting that the child’s best interest approach has 
not been disregarded, as “the two objectives of the Convention—the one preventative, the other 
designed to secure the immediate reintegration of the child into its habitual environment—both 
correspond to a specific idea of what constitutes the ‘best interests of the child’”). 
 54. See id. ¶ 24. 
The presumption generally stated is that the true victim of the “childnapping” is the child 
himself, who suffers from the sudden upsetting of his stability, the traumatic loss of contact 
with the parent who has been in charge of his upbringing, the uncertainty and frustration 
which come with the necessity to adapt to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions 
and unknown teachers and relatives. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 55. See id. ¶ 16. “The Convention, in order to bring this about, places at the head of its objectives 
the restoration of the status quo, by means of ‘the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or 
retained in any Contracting State.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 3 (providing when a removal or retention is to be 
considered wrongful). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. art. 3 (defining wrongful removal or retention). 
 62. See Toren v. Toren, 191 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that wrongful removal was not 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/8
p415 Lubin note book pages.doc4/26/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION 425 
 
 
 
 
 
 
allegedly abducted child is an habitual resident of the abducted-from 
country.63 An individual can only have one country of habitual residence 
at a time.64 Courts look to the time period immediately preceding the 
removal or retention to evaluate the child’s habitual residency and to 
determine whether the removal or retention was wrongful.65 
The Hague Convention provides limited and specific exceptions to the 
summary return mechanism that function as affirmative defenses for the 
alleged abductor.66 A child is not required to be returned to the abducted-
from country if: (1) the person seeking the return of the child under the 
Hague Convention was not exercising custody rights at the time of the 
abduction;67 (2) the person seeking the return of the child consented;68 (3) 
the child is put in grave risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm 
or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation;69 or (4) returning the child 
would be contrary to fundamental freedoms.70 Summary return may 
found under the Convention because the mother was abroad, as allowed by their custody agreement). 
The court noted that, “the language and structure of Article 3 of the Hague Convention clearly indicate 
that there must be an initial determination as to whether there has been a removal or retention before 
any inquiry can be made into whether such removal or retention was wrongful.” Id. at 27. 
 63. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 66. The Report describes “habitual residence” as “a well-
established concept in the Hague Conference, which regards it as a question of pure fact, differing in 
that respect from domicile.” Id. See also Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(recognizing “‘[h]abitual residence’ is not defined in the language of the Hague Convention or by 
ICARA, and the text of the Convention directs courts to only one point in time in determining habitual 
residence: the point in time “immediately before the removal or retention”) (citing Hague Convention, 
supra note 9, art. 3). In contrast, the court in Delvoye v. Lee found that “[t]he determination of a 
person’s habitual residence is a mixed question of fact and law.” Delvoye v. Lee, 329 F.3d 330, 332 
(3d Cir. 2003). The court further asserted that, “in practice it is often not possible to make a distinction 
between the habitual residence of a child and that of its custodian.” Id. at 333 (citing BEAUMONT & 
MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 91). See also Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995) (setting a 
habitual residence standard). But see Paz v. De Paz, 47 Fed. Appx. 22 (2d Cir. 2002). “Parental intent 
is an important and in some cases dispositive factor in determining the habitual residence of a child.” 
Id. at 23. 
 64. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 66. 
 65. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 66. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13. 
 67. See id. art. 13(a) (stating “[t]he person, institution or other body having the care of the person 
of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention”). 
 68. Id. Article 13 also states that summary return is unavailable if the person “had consented to 
or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention . . .” Id. 
 69. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 29. The adoption of this text caused a serious breach in 
the consensus that had prevailed up to this point in the Hague Conference proceedings. 
Actually . . . the text . . . had limited the possible exceptions to the rule concerning the return 
of the child to a consideration of factual situations and of the conduct of the parties or to a 
specific evaluation of the interests of the child. On the other hand, the reservation just 
accepted implicitly permitted the possibility of the return of a child being refused on the basis 
of purely legal arguments drawn from the internal law of the requested State. 
Id. ¶ 32. 
 70. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 20. 
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likewise be refused if the child has attained an age and maturity that makes 
it appropriate to take the child’s views into account.71 
The exceptions to the summary return mechanism were purposely 
designed by the drafters to be very narrow so as not to undermine the 
effectiveness of the convention.72 After a wrongful removal or retention is 
proven, the court determines whether an exception to the summary return 
mechanism applies.73 The following describes the major exceptions to the 
summary return mechanism. 
1. Exception One: The Parent Seeking Return of the Child Was Not 
Exercising Custody Rights 
Once the court determines the child’s habitual residence is the 
abducted-from country, it determines whether the child’s removal was 
wrongful. The first step is to assess the parent’s custody rights prior to the 
abduction.74 If there is an existing court order defining the custody rights 
of the parents, the evaluating court abides by it.75 In the absence of such an 
order, the court will look to the law of the abducted-from country to 
determine parental custody rights.76 If custody rights did not exist or they 
 71. See id. art. 13(b) (stating, “the judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order 
the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and 
degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views”). 
 72. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 34. 
[The exceptions] are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to 
become a dead letter. In fact, the Convention as a whole rests upon the unanimous rejection of 
this phenomenon of illegal child removals and upon the conviction that the best way to 
combat them at an international level is to refuse to grant them legal recognition. 
Id. 
 73. See infra notes 74–97. 
 74. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 28. 
[T]he situations envisaged are those in which either the conditions prevailing prior to the 
removal of the child do not contain one of the elements essential to those relationships which 
the Convention seeks to protect . . . or else the subsequent behaviour [sic] of the dispossessed 
parent shows his acceptance of the new situation thus brought about . . . 
Id. 
 75. Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 499 (4th Cir. 2003). “The ‘Residence Order’ contained 
in the decree [gave the father] the exclusive power to determine [the child’s] residence, thereby 
necessarily depriving [the mother] of that same right.” Id. See also Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 
942 (9th Cir. 2002). “[Mother] argues that the existence of a ne exeat clause in the divorce agreement 
does not transform [father’s] visitation rights into custodial rights under the Convention. We agree.” 
Id. at 948. A ne exeat clause is defined as a “writ which forbids the person to whom it is addressed to 
leave the country, the state, or the jurisdiction of the court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (6th ed. 
1990).  
 76. See Shealy v. Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2002). “The Convention is very clear that the 
law of the country in which the child was habitually resident governs decisions as to whether custody 
rights existed at the time of removal.” Id. at 1124. See also Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 68 
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were not being exercised, then the removal of the child is not deemed 
wrongful.77  
Courts are wary, however, of evaluating whether custody rights were 
being exercised.78 The abductor has the burden to prove that custody rights 
either did not exist or were not being exercised by the dispossessed parent. 
If the abductor is unable to meet this burden, the abduction is deemed a 
wrongful removal. Once a wrongful removal is found, the summary return 
mechanism requires that the child be returned to their country of habitual 
residence unless another exception applies.79 
2. Exception Two: The Parent Seeking Return of the Child Consented 
If the now dispossessed parent consented at the time of the child’s 
removal, the abducting parent may use that consent as a defense to having 
to return the child.80 The burden of proof on the issue of consent is on the 
abducting party.81 If the court finds that there was in fact consent at the 
time of the child’s removal, then the child’s habitual residency is deemed 
irrelevant and the child will not be ordered returned.82 Technically, if the 
(explaining the broad interpretation given to the law defining custody rights as necessary to protect 
parents without a formal custody decree). 
 77. See Shealy, 295 F.3d at 1117. In Shealy, the parties did not dispute that the child was a 
habitual resident of the alleged abducted-from country, nor was their dispute that the father was 
exercising custody rights at the time of the child’s removal by the mother. Removal was not wrongful 
under the Hague Convention because the German custody decree had an exception for military 
necessity, and the mother’s military assignment had been transferred to another country. Therefore, the 
father’s rights had not been violated under the convention. That the mother requested a change of 
assignment, purposefully to be back in the United States and have her custody dispute decided there, 
did not alter the court’s findings. Id. 
 78. See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996). 
[A]n American decision about the adequacy of one parent’s exercise of custody rights is 
dangerously close to forbidden territory: the merits of the custody dispute. The [foreign] court 
. . . is perfectly capable of taking into account [father’s] behavior . . . A decision by an 
American court to deny return . . . because [father] did not show sufficient attention or 
concern for [child’s] welfare would preclude the [foreign] court from addressing these 
issues—and the [foreign] court may well resolve them differently. 
Id. at 1065. 
 79. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 72 (explaining that the exercise of custody rights is 
evaluated because “the Convention put its emphasis on protecting the right of children to have the 
stability which is so vital to them respected”). But see id. ¶ 73 (noting dissention regarding whether to 
evaluate if custody rights were being exercised in order to avoid placing a difficult burden on the 
claimant). 
 80. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13(a). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). 
 82. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13(a). 
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dispossessed parent consents at the time of the child’s removal, then it was 
not wrongful for purposes of the convention.83 
3. Exception Three: The Child Would Face a Grave Risk of Physical 
or Psychological Harm 
Another exception to the summary return mechanism arises when there 
is a grave risk84 that the child’s return would expose the child “to physical 
or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable 
situation.”85 Courts have routinely blocked abducting parents from 
introducing evidence that the child would suffer great harm by being 
separated from the abducting parent.86 Taken to its natural end, that policy 
creates perverse results by not considering evidence such as the child’s 
deep attachment to the primary caretaker, which very well may cause great 
injury to the child if separated.87 
 83. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 115. 
 84. See ICARA, supra note 9, § 11603 (e)(2)(A). ICARA provides that a respondent who 
opposes the return of the child by asserting the article 13(b) exception has the burden of proving this 
by clear and convincing evidence. Cf. Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] S.C.R. 591, 596 (Supreme Court 
of Canada finding that the harm contemplated by article 13(b) also amounts to an intolerable situation, 
and further noting that there is disagreement as to whether “the physical or psychological harm 
contemplated by the first clause of Article 13(b) is harm to a degree that also amounts to an intolerable 
situation”); Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000) (focusing on actions that may be taken in the 
country of the child’s habitual residence in order to mitigate the grave risk of harm). 
 85. See Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13(b); Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 29 
(explaining that the child’s interest of not being removed is overridden by, “the primary interest of any 
person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger or being placed in an intolerable 
situation”). 
 86. See, e.g., Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995). The abductor was a stay-at-home 
mother and the children’s primary caretaker. She cited studies recognizing potential psychological 
harm in separating children from their primary caretakers. However, the Court was unwilling to 
consider evidence that the children would be harmed through separation from their mother and the 
children were ordered to be sent back to the abducted-from country. Id. 
 87. See Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1995). “The district court 
incorrectly factored the possible separation of the child from his mother in assessing whether the return 
of the child to Mexico constitutes a grave risk that would expose him to physical or psychological 
harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation.” Id. at 377. The court noted that the child was 
six months old; there was a possibility that the baby could be institutionalized during the pendency of 
the Mexican custody proceedings; and the mother claimed that she had been physically, sexually, and 
verbally abused by her husband. These factors were not considered by the court. See also Friedrich v. 
Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (setting a high standard for what poses a grave risk). 
First, there is a grave risk of harm when return of a child puts the child in imminent danger 
prior to the resolution of the custody dispute—e.g., returning the child to a zone of war, 
famine, or disease. Second, there is a grave risk of harm in cases of serious abuse or neglect, 
or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual residence, 
for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection. 
Id. Accord Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] D.L.R. 253, 286 (defining the degree of harm necessary to 
qualify under the 13(b) exception as “harm to a degree that also amounts to an intolerable situation”). 
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When evaluating grave risk, the court considers what steps can be 
taken in the abducted-from country to mitigate the potentially grave risk of 
returning the child.88 In case law, potential mitigating factors in the 
abducted-from country are called undertakings. The question of grave risk 
analysis and whether the abducted-from country will be able to provide 
sufficient undertakings to ensure the child’s safety is especially poignant 
when domestic violence is alleged. There is conflicting precedent 
controlling whether spousal abuse constitutes grave risk under the 
convention’s exception.89 This illustrates that courts do not easily find a 
grave risk exception to the summary return mechanism; it is construed 
narrowly and fails in most cases.90 
 88. Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2000).  
The undertakings approach allows courts to conduct an evaluation of the placement options 
and legal safeguards in the country of habitual residence to preserve the child’s safety while 
the courts of that country have the opportunity to determine custody of the children within the 
physical boundaries of their jurisdiction. Given the strong presumption that a child should be 
returned, many courts, both here and in other countries, have determined that the reception of 
undertakings best allows for the achievement of the goals set out in the Convention while, at 
the same time, protecting children from exposure to grave risk of harm. 
Id. But see Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that sexual abuse 
allegations were to be decided in the abducted-to country when evaluating whether there is a 13(b) 
grave risk exception, rather than taking the approach of sending children back to the abducted-from 
country and allowing sexual abuse allegations to be investigated through that court system). 
 89. See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 220 (finding undertakings would be inadequate, because although 
Irish courts would issue protective order, the father’s history of disobeying court orders would leave 
the children’s grave risk unmitigated). 
First, [the father] has demonstrated an uncontrollably violent temper, and his assaults have 
been bloody and severe. His temper and assaults are not in the least lessened by the presence 
of his two youngest children . . . Second, [the father] has demonstrated that his violence 
knows not the bonds between parent and child or husband and wife, which should restrain 
such behavior. Third, [the father] has gotten into fights with persons much younger than he 
. . . . Fourth, credible social science literature establishes that serial spousal abusers are also 
likely to be child abusers. Fifth, both state and federal law have recognized that children are at 
increased risk of physical and psychological injury themselves when they are in contact with 
a spousal abuser. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). But see Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 378. In Nunez-Escudero, the 
mother fled Mexico to the United States with her two-month old infant. She submitted evidence that 
she was physically, sexually, and verbally abused by the infant’s father and that the infant’s father and 
paternal grandfather treated her as a prisoner. The district court, considering potential undertakings, 
including the infant being institutionalized to mitigate potential 13(b) grave risk, found that to be an 
intolerable situation. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the district court improperly 
considered factors applicable only to the mother and father, and incorrectly factored in the potential 
harm to the infant if separated from his mother. The appellate court remanded to the district court with 
instructions “not to consider evidence relevant to custody or the child’s best interests.” Id. See also 
Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2000) (declining to find spousal abuse applicable to the 13(b) 
grave risk analysis). 
 90. See, e.g., Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 901 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that 
although a war zone may constitute a grave risk to having a child returned, the situation Israel in 1996 
was not sufficiently dangerous to be considered a war zone). But see Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 
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4. Exception Four: Return of the Child Blocked if Contrary to 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Another exception to the summary return mechanism following an 
affirmative finding of wrongful removal arises when return would be 
contrary to fundamental freedoms.91 This exception is the result of a 
compromise regarding a public policy exception.92 The dissention 
stemming from the adoption of this provision highlights what may be 
considered the conflicting aims of the convention in that this provision 
provides denial of jurisdiction to the child’s habitual residence.93 This 
exception has never been successfully argued.94  
5. Exception Five: Summary Return May be Denied when a Child is 
Found to have Sufficient Maturity and Objects to Being Returned 
A final exception to the summary return mechanism is based upon the 
child’s own objection, so long as the child is found to be of sufficient age 
and maturity.95 The Hague Convention applies only to children under the 
age of sixteen, which gives context to the approximate age and maturity 
the drafters considered.96 This provision leaves significant room for 
1, 16 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding sexual abuse of a child to constitute a grave risk). “The Article 13(b) 
exceptions are narrow, and should be construed narrowly by the courts.” Id. 
 91. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 20 (elaborating upon when return “would not be 
permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”). 
 92. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 31 (finally agreeing that “‘Contracting States may 
reserve the right not to return the child when such return would be manifestly incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of the law relating to the family and children in the State addressed.’”). 
 93. See id. ¶ 32. 
[The debate over the fundamental freedoms exception] reflected two partly different concepts 
concerning the Convention’s objects as regards the return of the child . . . [Until now, the 
text] had limited the possible exceptions to the rule concerning the return of the child to a 
consideration of factual situations and of the conduct of the parties or to a specific evaluation 
of the interests of the child. On the other hand, the reservation just accepted implicitly 
permitted the possibility of the return of a child being refused on the basis of purely legal 
arguments drawn from the internal law of the requested State . . . 
Id. 
 94. Mast, supra note 52, at 253. 
 95. See supra note 71; see also Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 30. “[T]he Convention also 
provides that the child’s views concerning the essential question of its return or retention may be 
conclusive . . .” Id. 
 96. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 30. 
[This] provision is absolutely necessary given the fact that the Convention applies, ratione 
personae, to all children under the age of sixteen; the fact must be acknowledged that it 
would be very difficult to accept that a child of, for example fifteen years of age, should be 
returned against its will. 
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judicial discretion as to whether a child’s views will be considered and 
how much weight those views will be given.97 
III. ANALYSIS 
The type of international abduction the Hague Convention was drafted 
to address is very different from the current abductions to which the 
convention is being applied. That discrepancy has led to the convention 
applying unjustly in certain situations. In order to retain the utility of the 
Hague Convention, the proposed adjustments are grounded in the tenets of 
the convention and attempt to change as little as possible while still 
effecting these necessary changes. The first proposal predominantly 
addresses the gendered correlation of international relocation for career 
prospects, as well as the counterintuitive application of the convention 
should the accompanying spouse want to return “home” with her children. 
The second proposal focuses on domestic violence and the need to include 
an exception to the convention’s summary return mechanism for domestic 
violence victims fleeing internationally with their children. 
A. The Hague Conventions Approach to International Abduction is Based 
on False Presumptions 
The Hague Convention must remain current to address today’s trends 
rather than yesterday’s presumptions. The problem envisioned in 1980 
was non-primary caretakers abducting their children; however, it is 
primary caretakers who are the statistical majority of parental abductors.98  
Id. See also England v. England, 234 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000) (construing the age and maturity of a 
child). 
[I]f the age and maturity exception . . . is to have any meaning at all, it must be available for a 
child who is less than 16 years old . . . I would conclude . . . a 13 year old [has attained 
sufficient age] to take account of her views . . . [nor was there any evidence that she was 
immature for her age]. To the contrary, . . . [the child] was an average student academically, 
maintaining the school grade level commensurate with her age, and that she was engaged in a 
variety of sports and extracurricular activities . . . . [She] was of sufficient age and maturity 
that the court could give recognition to this objection. 
Id. at 274–75 (dissenting opinion) (citations omitted). 
 97. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 30 (noting the Drafters considered having a minimum age 
at which the child’s views would be considered, but that idea failed for being too arbitrary). See also 
England, 234 F.3d at 272 (ordering thirteen year-old returned to habitual residence over her protests). 
But see England, 234 F.3d at 273–74 (dissenting opinion) (stating “[The child] has clearly objected to 
being returned to Australia and she is old enough [thirteen] and mature enough for the Court to take 
account of her views.” (citations omitted)). 
 98. See supra notes 38, 39, 51, and 52 and accompanying text. 
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One type of parental kidnapping is a non-primary caretaker99 abducting 
the child for fear of not having custody rights. This type of abduction is 
generally thought to be motivated by shopping for a forum that would 
provide a more favorable award of custody.100 Although not malevolent in 
the same way as stranger kidnapping, parental abduction may at times be 
fueled by a bare desire to harm the child’s other parent, or to gain the 
upper-hand against the dispossessed parent.101 From the child’s point-of-
view, in non-primary caretaker abduction, the consequences may be 
especially severe as a child’s relationship with the primary caretaker is 
likely the most important and comforting relationship. Indeed, “home” for 
the child is most likely definable as being with the primary caretaker. 
The perceived problem of non-primary caretakers abducting their 
children does not represent the statistical majority of parents who remove 
their children to another country.102 In fact, the majority of parents 
abducting their children internationally, thereby coming within the Hague 
Convention’s jurisdiction, are primary caretakers.103 The motivations of 
primary caretakers are frequently different from non-primary caretakers. 
Fear of having a custody dispute resolved disfavorably likely plays less of 
a role in their decision to abduct the child. Further, a child’s experience of 
being abducted by a primary caretaker is likely qualitatively different and 
less harmful.104 Nonetheless, the Hague Convention does not currently 
recognize these distinctions and its strict workings are not altered to reflect 
the parent’s relationship with the child.105 This group of abductors was 
simply not considered in drafting the Hague Convention. 
The Preamble to the convention defines its purpose as “desiring to 
protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful 
removal or retention . . . .”106 The focus appears to be protecting children 
 99. Non-primary caretakers are typically fathers. 
 100. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 6, ¶ 7. 
 101. See id. ¶ 15 (describing wrongfully dispossessed parent’s disadvantage, prior to the 
Convention even when proceedings were initiated in a timely fashion). 
 102. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 3. See also Mast, supra note 52, at 245–46; 
Weiner, supra note 52, at 277–79 (considering solutions and implications of altering remedy of return 
in recognition of the actual demographics of abductors being primary caretakers). 
 103. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 3. 
 104. See id. at 13. “[I]t might also be the case that for the children themselves the necessity of 
being returned is lessened. Emotionally their relationship with the abductor might be strong and 
possibly worthy of greater protection than that with the dispossessed custodian.” Id. 
 105. Hague Convention, supra note 9. 
 106. Hague Convention, supra note 9, pmbl., art. 1. Article 1 states that “the objects of the present 
convention are: a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 
Contracting State; and b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access are effectively respected in 
other Contracting States.” Id. art. 1. 
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from harmful effects as distinct from wrongful removal per se.107 
Children’s needs for protection vary greatly depending on their 
relationship with their abductor.108 For instance, if abducted by their 
primary caretaker, it may be reasonable to conclude that they may not 
suffer any harmful effects.109 Other factors that may be predictive as to 
whether an abduction is harmful to the child are: the relationship the child 
had with the dispossessed parent, how integrated the child was in the 
country of habitual residence (friends, school, etc.), the contacts the child 
has in the abducted-to state (how much time the child has spent there), and 
cultural factors (such as how different are the two countries in terms of, for 
example, language and religion).110  
Another factor is to consider the primary caretaker’s autonomy interest 
in raising the child. Although an automatic allowance for the primary 
caretaker to move wherever they want and for whatever reason would be 
unsound, so is the current presumption in favor of the non-primary 
caretaker. Whereas the Hague Convention sought to remove the forum 
shopping advantage from the non-primary caretaker abductor, non-primary 
caretakers are now vested with a great deal of power over the abducting 
parent.111 The drafters formulated the convention to be strict and swift; 
unfortunately leaving the primary caretakers, who are generally women, in 
the untenable position of being without their children or returning to the 
country from which they escaped.112 For many women, it is not a choice 
but a mandate, based on an emotional connection that forces them to be 
 107. Article 1 of the convention, where wrongful removal is the sole focus, does not make this 
distinction. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 108. See BEAUMONT & MCELVEAY, supra note 1, at 7–13 (discussing the differences experienced 
by children depending on whether they are abducted by their primary caretaker or someone else). 
 109. See infra note 160 and accompanying text for the proposition that it is not harmful to remove 
children from a situation involving domestic violence when they will continue to be with their primary 
caretaker as compared with remaining in contact with both parents. 
 110. The Hague Convention, on the other hand, does not consider the quality of contacts the child 
had in the abducted-from and abducted-to states.  
 111. See Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic 
Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 599 (2000). 
To the extent that domestic violence was considered at all by policy makers, fathers were 
sometimes thought to abduct their children as a way of abusing the children’s mothers. 
Against this backdrop, the Hague Convention’s quick ‘right of return’ remedy and its limited 
defenses made perfect sense. However, the Hague Convention framework makes far less 
sense as a remedy for abductions by primary caretakers, often mothers, who take their 
children with them when they flee from domestic violence. 
Id. 
 112. See Weiner, supra note 22, at 750. “[Battered women’s] relationships with their children may 
be more important than their own safety. Asking these battered women to safeguard themselves at the 
expense of their relationship with their children, or at the expense of their children’s well-being, may 
be asking the impossible.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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with their child.113 The power imbalance now existing must be retooled in 
order to better protect women and children. 
Although the terms primary and non-primary caretaker appear gender-
neutral, in reality they are not. The great majority of primary caretakers are 
women, whereas the great majority of non-primary caretakers are men.114 
These gender-correlated relationships, in conjunction with the different 
social realities affecting women, combine to highlight the disconnect 
between the problem the Hague Convention sought to remedy, and the 
situations to which it is currently being applied. 
B. Women, as Primary Caretakers, are Disadvantaged by the Hague 
Convention 
1. Gendered Effects in Employment 
One example of how the Hague Convention disadvantages women is in 
the context of international career relocation. The division of labor within 
families, as well as the wage gap in paid labor, continues to be largely 
divided along gender lines.115 These two forces combine such that 
international family relocation in pursuance of career opportunity is more 
likely to be for the father’s career than for the mother’s.116 Although a 
growing number of families are dual-income, if one parent stays home to 
raise the children it is still most likely the mother.117 Even when both 
parents work, commonly the mother earns much less than the father.118 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Gender Issues Research Center, Child Support Facts, at http://www.gendercenter.org/ 
support.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) (noting that in the United States, in 1998, 85.1% of custodial 
parents were women). 
 115. See generally Philip N. Cohen, The Gender Division of Labor: “Keeping House” and 
Occupational Segregation in the United States, 18 GENDER & SOC’Y 239 (2004) (discussing gender 
segregation, inequality, and divisions of labor in the paid labor market and in the home). 
 116. See Regina M. Watkins et al., The Juxtaposition of Career and Family: A Dilemma for 
Professional Women, ADVANCING WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP JOURNAL (Winter 1998), at http://www. 
advancingwomen.com/awl/winter98/awlv2_watkins5.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). 
Few women have the luxury of relocating in order to attain job advancement. Ninety percent 
of women reported they would relocate only if their husbands secured employment. Seventy-
five percent of men would relocate for a better job with or without the spouse’s employment. 
In fact, our society ‘discourages family change for the sake of a wife's career.’ 
Id. 
 117. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau Press Release, “Stay-at-Home” Parents Top 5 Million, Census 
Bureau Reports, Nov. 30, 2004, at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/ 
families_households/003118.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (reporting “5.4 million moms and 98,000 
dads” are stay-at-home parents). 
 118. See, e.g., Marie Drolet, The Male-female Wage Gap, 2 PERSP. ON LAB. & INCOME 12 (2001), 
at http://www.statcan.ca/english/studies/75-001/01201/hi-fs_200112_01_a.html (last visited Feb. 5, 
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Further, women continue to shoulder more of the child-rearing 
responsibilities in dual-income families and frequently work fewer paid 
hours than men.119 Therefore, if a family is going to relocate 
internationally on account of career incentives, it is more likely to be for 
his career than for hers.120 
Career opportunities, including those requiring international relocation, 
are frequently open-ended as opposed to having a set duration.121 When a 
family relocates internationally, however, the open-ended aspect of the 
move means that the child’s habitual residency, as proscribed by the 
convention, will be changed.122 The inquiry into the child’s habitual 
residence is not affected by the mother’s reluctance to relocate.123 At the 
junction of deciding whether to move, the Hague Convention applies in a 
counterintuitive way. If a woman chooses to keep her family intact and 
move with her husband, and later decides to return “home” with her 
children, the act of returning home is considered international child 
abduction.124 However, her willingness to move was likely conditioned 
upon the continuance of her marriage.125 In the event of marital discord, a 
2005). “In 1997, the average annual earnings of women working full-year, full-time [in Canada] were 
73% of men’s.” Id. 
 119. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Workers are on the Job More Hours over the Course of the Year, 
ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS (Feb. 1997) (reporting the average annual work hours to be 1,905 for 
men, and 1,526 for women). 
 120. Kathryn Tyler, Don’t Fence Her In—Considering Women for International Postings, HR 
MAGAZINE, March, 2001, at 70, 73. “Women are only fourteen percent of the expatriates working for 
U.S. companies” and only fifty percent of married male expatriates are in dual-career marriages.” Id. 
See also Annual Transferee Demographic Survey, 17 RUNZHEIMER REPORTS ON RELOCATION, May 
1998, at 1–2 (noting that a “typical transferee profile remains a white male, aged 35 to 45 years, with 
two children” and referring to women as atypical transferees); Jarod Roch, Dealing with Expatriate 
Relocation, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia), Apr. 3, 2001 (noting “69 percent of expatriates are 
married . . . Of those spouses, 49 percent were employed before an assignment and only 11 percent 
were employed during an assignment”). 
 121. See Global Relocation Trends, 2003/2004 Survey Report, May 2004, http://www.gmacglobal 
relocation.com/2003survey (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). “[I]n all of our past surveys, assignments of one 
year or less in duration constituted only 13% of the total number of assignments. This year, by 
contrast, 70% of international assignments were scheduled for one year or less in duration.” Id. at 5. 
 122. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(a). 
 123. See, e.g., Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the four-year-old 
child’s habitual residence had moved from the United States to Australia as he was there close to six 
months before removal by his mother back to the United States because his mother had been reluctant 
to move to Australia, but had hoped to save her failing marriage). But see id. at 227 (dissenting opinion 
pointing out that in determining where the four year old is a habitual resident, the court should 
consider not only the period immediately preceding removal, but the child’s life as a whole because, 
“it has immediate impact on the child’s place of residence, and ultimately and realistically it will 
impact upon the final custody determination”). 
 124. See, e.g., id.  
 125. International relocation for one spouse’s work in and of itself appears to cause significant 
stress in jobs. See Roch, supra note 120. “The most common reason listed for assignment failure is the 
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woman who moved internationally solely because her soon-to-be ex-
spouse’s job relocated would likely want to return to her home.126 Through 
application of the Convention, her children’s habitual residence becomes 
the foreign country.127 The woman’s decision to move with her children’s 
father and keep her family together may permanently erase her choice of 
raising her children in her country.128 
From a policy standpoint, this is a perverse effect. It essentially 
encourages the woman to split up the family now, rather than run the risk 
of not being able to take her children back to her home country if the 
marriage fails.129 If a woman is in a rocky marriage and wants to maintain 
lack of partner satisfaction (twenty-seven percent) that directly ties to work.” Id. 
 126. See, e.g., England v. England, 234 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000). The parents in the case, U.S. 
citizens, raised their children in Texas until the father’s job relocated them to Australia. Id. After living 
there for two years, the whole family visited Texas. Id. The mother and two children (now ages 
fourteen and four) took an extended vacation in Texas. The mother soon after filed for divorce, and the 
father petitioned to have the wrongfully removed children returned. The mother argued that there was 
a grave risk to the older child’s emotional health as she had endured “turbulent history in orphanages 
and foster care . . . [and] would face a grave risk of psychological harm if separated from her mother or 
forced to move so soon after re-settling in Texas.” Id. at 270. The court denied that there was a grave 
risk to her emotional well-being, stressing that the emotional harm from being separated from her 
mother was not to be considered. Id. at 271–72. 
 127. For example, in England, the court determined the children’s habitual residences were in 
Australia and ordered them sent back. Id. The mother argued that as their primary caretaker, the 
children would be injured by being separated from her; the court didn’t find separation from their 
abductor to be a valid concern. Id. at 271–72. 
 128. Feder, 63 F.3d at 230–31 (dissenting opinion). 
While it may be that Mr. Feder had, and Mrs. Feder did not have, a settled purpose to reside 
in Sydney, it is significant that [child] stayed with his mother in [the United States] until she 
left, traveling to Sydney only when she did. This indicates some correspondence between the 
purposes of mother and child. While it is virtually impossible to ascertain the settled purpose 
of such a young child, it is more closely aligned here to that of the mother. That is not meant 
to indicate that the mother’s purpose should necessarily predominate, but rather that the facts 
of this matter support that conclusion . . . [W]e must be mindful of the consequence . . . the 
child will be taken from his mother’s home . . . where he has spent virtually all of his years, in 
contrast to the time spent with his father in Australia . . . [T]he best interests of the child . . . 
should not be ignored in these preliminary proceedings. Such tugging and shuttling can only 
be detrimental.  
Id. 
 129. Of course, the Hague Convention would not pose an impediment to a parent who had a child 
custody decree and permission from the host country’s court to remove the children. The convention 
would have no application in that situation. The Hague Convention would be a prohibition in the 
absence of an explicit custody decree, unless one of the above noted exceptions applied. However, 
parents trying to return “home” with their children have a high likelihood of being forbidden by the 
court or facing other substantial legal hurdles. See, e.g., Leonie Lamont, Judges Clash on Mother’s 
Right to Leave, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 7–8, 2002, at 10 (reporting a decision of the High 
Court in Australia in which an Indian family moved to Australia and the mother lost the battle to return 
with her children to India). “‘The burden of such injustices will ordinarily fall, as here, on the wife. It 
will be she, not the husband, who will usually be confined, in effect, in her personal movements, 
emotional environment, employment opportunities and chances of remarriage, repartnering and 
reparenting,’ Justice Kirby said.” Id. 
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her ability to raise her child in her own country, she should refuse to 
move. If the marriage was doomed to fail, the loss of family unity was not 
caused by the Hague Convention. If, however, the marriage would have 
improved with time, the convention could serve as the catalyst to an 
unnecessary dissolution.130 If one of the parents agrees to move 
conditioned solely upon the continuation of the marriage, these perverse 
consequences, which would have the effect of trapping her, should not 
follow. 
Evaluating habitual residence from the period immediately preceding 
the alleged abduction has problematic implications for families who 
relocate internationally due to a career opportunity for one parent. The 
second parent’s willingness to relocate may have the dramatic 
consequence of trapping that parent in the foreign country if that parent is 
unwilling to leave the children. It would be more just to evaluate the 
child’s habitual residence with an inquiry into the child’s life as a whole. 
Determining a child’s habitual residence could still consider where the 
child has lived for the last six months; however, that would only be one of 
many factors. Other factors would include where children have spent the 
majority of their life and where they have social connections. A more 
holistic evaluation of habitual residence could take into account parental 
intentions and would not disadvantage women as the existing habitual 
resident evaluation does.131 Likewise, giving women a choice between 
their country and their child carries with it a substantial risk of harm to the 
child. Two distinct possibilities are that the child’s custodial parent will 
return to their country of origin without the child, or the child will be 
raised by their custodial parent with that parent feeling like a hostage in 
the country. The child returning to live in a country the child is familiar 
with and acclimated to is not the harm the Hague Convention sought to 
deter. 
2. Domestic Violence 
A second way in which the Hague Convention produces a disparate 
impact on women results from the prevalence of domestic abuse, and the 
fact that the statistical majority of victims of domestic violence are 
 130. This assertion necessarily implies knowledge of the Hague Convention. However, if the law 
is applying in a way that would be wholly unexpected by most, it may be unfair and/or unreasonable.  
 131. Lamont, supra note 129 (discussing decision to not let a custodial mother return to India with 
her child). “[I]t is she who will be controlled by court orders that require her to live, and make the 
most of her life, in physical proximity to the husband’s whereabouts . . . Inconvenience to the husband 
is minimized. But the effect on the wife may be profound.” Id. 
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women.132 The situation of victims of domestic violence who abduct their 
children in order to escape abuse is not expressly provided for in the 
Hague Convention,133 which is problematic considering how frequently 
mothers abduct their children to escape domestic violence.134 Whether the 
child will be ordered to return depends on judicial discretion, and cases 
involving domestic violence have come out both ways.135 This situation is 
especially appalling because a woman may escape domestic violence only 
to have her child sent back.136 This divide in the case law of the Hague 
Convention signals the need for a change in approach. 
If domestic violence was considered by the drafters, their 
conceptualization likely involved the abuser, rather than the victim, 
abducting the child.137 That supposition correlates with the presumption of 
non-custodial parents abducting their children, as non-custodial parents are 
predominately fathers,138 and the perpetrators of abuse are usually men.139 
In light of the underlying logic of the convention, abduction by an abusive 
parent would be precisely what the Hague Convention sought to 
discourage and remedy.140 The swift application of the summary return 
mechanism would, if this presumption was a reflection of reality, be an 
 132. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991). Although limited to the United States in scope, the article recognizes the 
mass-impact of domestic violence. 
Up to one half of all American women—and approximately two thirds of women who are 
separated or divorced—report having experienced physical assault in their relationships. 
However, litigation and judicial decisionmaking in cases of severe violence reflect implicit or 
explicit assumptions that domestic violence is rare or exceptional. 
Id. at 3. 
 133. Compare with the International Parental Kidnapping Act of 1993, 18 U.S.C. § 1204(c)(2) 
(2000), which includes an explicit affirmative defense for persons fleeing domestic violence.  
 134. Weiner, supra note 22, at 765. “Published figures indicate that seventy percent of the 
abductors are now mothers, typically the child’s primary caretaker. Often these mothers are victims of 
domestic violence, and they are fleeing transnationally with their children in order to escape . . .” Id. 
(internal citations omitted) 
 135. See supra note 89. 
 136. As well as being sent back herself if she is unwilling to allow her child to return without her 
child. 
 137. See generally Weiner, supra note 111. “Domestic violence between the abductor and the left-
behind parent was not usually part of the paradigm, probably because domestic violence was not as 
highly visible a political issue in the late 1970s and the early 1980s as it is today.” Id. at 605. 
 138. See Child Support Facts, supra note 114. 
 139. District of Columbia Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Statistics, at 
http://www.dccadv.org/statistics.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005), citing A Report of the Violence 
against Women Research Strategic Planning Workshop sponsored by the National Institute of Justice 
in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1995). “[Approximately] 90-
95% of domestic violence victims are women.” Id. citing Bureau of Justice Statistics Selected 
Findings: Violence Between Intimates (1994). 
 140. Weiner, supra note 111, at 599. 
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appropriate means to protect the child from the harm perpetuated either 
directly by the abuser or indirectly from the loss of contact with the child’s 
mother and familiar surroundings.141 Current abductions instigated by 
domestic violence are juxtaposed, however, because it is the victim who 
abducts rather than the perpetrator. 
The Hague Convention operates in a climate where a statistical 
majority of custodial mothers abduct, and a high percentage of them are 
escaping domestic violence.142 It is indefensible that, under the 
convention, an abused parent may flee with the child from the abusive 
parent, only to have the summary return mechanism deliver the child back 
to the abuser.143 Within the context of escaping domestic abuse, the policy 
concern of not wanting to reward culpable behavior has the opposite effect 
in application.144 In the majority of cases, the dispossessed parent is 
culpable of abuse, and the fleeing parent is the victim.145 But the summary 
return mechanism would send the child back to the abusive parent, an 
outcome contrary to the intent of the drafters and the goal underlying the 
summary return mechanism. That the mechanism should work in favor of 
the abusive parent cannot be tolerated. 
The convention should not have the effect of encouraging women to 
stay with their abusers. It is widely documented that the most dangerous 
period in relationships characterized by violence is the time of initial 
separation.146 If a woman’s life is threatened or lost at the hands of her 
abuser, the period closest to separation is when it will most likely occur.147 
Physical distance may help her stay safe. Furthermore, women need 
support and encouragement to help them leave their batterers, followed by 
protection from the law, rather than unintended negative consequences of 
its application. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See supra notes 132 and 134. 
 143. See Weiner, supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 144. Id. at 769. “The Hague Convention . . . traps countless numbers of women and children in 
abusive relationships . . . These are also victims who do flee, but then return with their children after 
their batterer succeeds on his Hague Convention application.” Id. “[It’s] purpose is to dissuade 
abduction, and the number of women who have been dissuaded by the . . . Convention from leaving an 
abusive relationship will never be known definitively. When a victim of violence is dissuaded, the . . . 
Convention perpetuates violence, harms women and children, and contributes to gender subordination 
generally.” Id. at 799. 
 145. Id. at 757. 
 146. See Mahoney, supra note 132, at 5–6. 
 147. See id. 
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C. Proposals 
1. Wage Gap Proposal 
International relocation continues to be a gendered occurrence, in that 
the great majority of relocations in pursuance of one’s career are largely a 
male phenomenon.148 Additionally, although the trend may be changing, 
the international assignments have tended to be on a long-term basis.149 
Long-term international relocation, meanwhile, implicates significant 
consequences in terms of the Hague Convention in that the child’s habitual 
residence may well be seen as the country to which the family moved on 
account of the husband’s job.150 Therefore, if the accompanying spouse 
changes her mind after the international relocation and attempts to return 
“home” with her child, it will likely be child abduction for purposes of the 
convention.151 One of the most problematic aspects of these convention 
mechanics is that it encourages families to break up hastily rather than 
accompany the father on his international career opportunity. Although 
most families do not spend their days reading international conventions, a 
law with such drastic consequences should not apply in counterintuitive 
ways. For women who choose to uproot their families and accompany 
their spouse on his international relocation assignment, having their 
child’s habitual residence change to the new country results in something 
more akin to a mousetrap than appropriate international policy in regard to 
the mother. 
This Note proposes to change the meaning of habitual residence under 
the convention. The new presumption would be that the child’s habitual 
residence is where the child has spent the majority of her life. This 
presumption, however, may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. An 
illustrative rather than exhaustive list of considerations that may rebut the 
presumption may include: (1) a showing that the majority of the child’s 
friends, family, and social support are in the other country; (2) although 
the child spent more time in one country, they have spent the majority of 
their time that they can remember in the other country; and (3) the child’s 
cultural, language, or religious identity is based in the other country. This 
is a more holistic and less mechanical determination of habitual residence 
that helps make individualized determinations to fit the needs of the 
 148. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
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particular situation. Keeping in mind that the big picture idea of the 
convention is protecting children from harm,152 determining harm to a 
child in a particular case could best be accomplished by considering the 
child’s life as a whole. This solution would be effective not only to 
remedy gender disparity in relation to international career relocation and 
child abduction, but in other cases with the same scenario of being 
abducted to a place the child actually has experienced as “home.” 
The most unpalatable aspect of this proposal is that it grays what was a 
black letter rule. This change would likewise increase judicial discretion in 
determining whether the presumption of habitual residency has been 
rebutted. The issue of judicial discretion, meanwhile, harkens back to 
issues the drafters had confronted with the child’s best interest test.153 
While these are all valid concerns, the benefits of this change outweigh the 
downside, particularly because judicial discretion would be explicitly 
limited by a rebuttable presumption and with illustrations for judicial 
guidance. Additionally, while there is great benefit in having a black letter 
rule, especially for the judicial ease with which it may be applied and for 
the fact that it discourages litigation, a parent’s right to raise her child in 
her own country, individualized justice, and decisions tailored to the needs 
of individual families are concerns that must trump judicial efficiency and 
decreased litigation. 
2. Domestic Violence Proposal 
Although the Hague Convention’s existing exceptions to the summary 
return mechanism are inadequate in situations of escaping domestic 
violence, the goals of the convention may be employed to seek a solution 
for victims of domestic violence who internationally abduct their children. 
The existing exceptions to the summary return mechanism are based upon 
the underlying principles of the convention. Using the principles that 
support the existing exceptions facilitates the conceptualization of a 
remedy consistent with the goals of the Hague Convention. 
First are the exceptions that consider the custody rights of dispossessed 
parents, and whether these rights were being exercised at the time of 
abduction, to determine whether removal was wrongful.154 The underlying 
reason for considering custody rights is to protect the child’s relationship 
 152. See Hague Convention, supra note 9, pmbl. 
 153. See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text (discussing the inherently problematic “child’s 
best interest” analysis in an international context). 
 154. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (regarding wrongful removal). 
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with both parents.155 This relationship, however, which deserves protection 
from the child’s point-of-view, presumes no harm to the child.156 If the 
relationship is in fact harmful, preserving the relationship undermines the 
convention’s objective of protecting children. Statistically, there is a high 
degree of correlation between men who batter their partner and men who 
abuse their children, and regardless of whether the child is the target of 
abuse, witnessing domestic violence is in any case abusive to children.157 
The child may be harmed in a variety of ways, such as by having a parent 
who is constantly frightened, or engaging in a pattern of learned 
helplessness, or by being exposed to a person who has exhibited a 
propensity for violence and a demonstrated inability to control behavior.158 
For all of the foregoing reasons, protecting a child’s relationship with both 
parents is undermined when one parent is an abuser. Therefore, protection 
of custody rights of both spouses may not be a justifiable goal of the 
Hague Convention and does not respond to the needs of an abused spouse. 
The second group of exceptions, the grave risk exception and the 
fundamental freedoms exception, may be distilled to the notion of 
excepting the summary return mechanism where it would harm the child 
to be returned to its habitual residence.159 Relating back to the first set of 
exceptions, returning the child to a place where it was subject to the wrath 
of the abuser, does not protect the child.160 Rather, it exposes the child to 
direct harm from the abuser or, if sufficient undertakings are taken in the 
habitual residence, subjects the child to the emotional damage of revisiting 
the place where harm was experienced. 
The third type of exception, based on a child’s own wishes, highlights 
the crucial distinction between children and mere property. Unlike 
property, children have an autonomous self-interest which, at different 
times in their life, may either coalesce with the interests of a parent or be 
contrary to the parents’ interests.161 Recognition that children possess an 
autonomous interest does not support, for example, sending an objecting 
child to live with an abusive parent.162 Taken generally, however, this 
 155. See Hague Conference Press Release, supra note 15. 
 156. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 157. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text. 
 160. See generally Stephen Doyne et al., Custody Disputes Involving Domestic Violence: Making 
Children’s Needs a Priority, 50 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1999) (noting effects traced to witnessing 
abuse, including “internalizing” effects such as depression, anxiety, and withdrawal, as well as 
“externalizing” effects such as aggression, “acting out” behaviors and delinquency). 
 161. See supra notes 106–10. 
 162. Lamentably, case law is divided on this issue. See supra note 89. 
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exception recognizes children’s individual interests, regardless of whether 
they are able to articulate those interests and advocate for themselves. In 
order to respect the goals supporting this exception, regardless of whether 
a child is able to advocate for itself, its interest in being free from abusive 
parents should trump any rights asserted by the parents. 
The goal of preventing harm to children must be furthered rather than 
impeded in cases where women abduct their children internationally to 
escape abuse.163 One concern about fashioning a policy to achieve those 
 163. See Weiner, supra note 111, at 616 (arguing certain factors must be found before the 
convention is changed). 
A change in the law becomes necessary only if 1) the harm to children from abduction differs 
depending upon the gender of the abductor and the reason for the abduction, and/or 2) women 
who flee with their children to escape domestic violence have their safety or their children’s 
safety unreasonably compromised by [the convention], or otherwise suffer unfairly from [the 
convention’s] application to their situation. This article suggests that both of these 
conclusions have validity. 
Id. This commentator proposed several potential revisions of the Hague Convention. See id. at 674–
703. Relying on undertakings in the country of habitual residence is one option. This approach calls 
for the summary return mechanism to take effect upon agreement to take sufficient undertakings to 
ensure the safety of the child and mother. Weiner suggests that there are potential shortcomings to this 
approach, including: financial hardship on the mother; the undertakings may not offer sufficient 
protection against the abuser; returning the child is not always the appropriate remedy; the lack of 
power equality between victim and abuser may obviate a court’s determination of which undertakings 
are necessary; and undertakings would only be appropriate in a jurisdiction that adequately responds to 
domestic violence—which not all do. 
 A second option is to ratify the Protection Convention, which provides emergency jurisdiction in 
abducted-to fora in cases of domestic violence. Problems here include the fact that only two countries 
have ratified the Protection Convention; it does not alter the summary return mechanism and is 
therefore problematic for similar reasons as the undertakings approach—specifically in jurisdictions 
without adequate assistance to victims of domestic violence; the Protection Convention allows the 
child’s habitual residence to be determined based on whether that country is able to manage the case 
and assure safety; the Protection Convention also advocates alternative dispute resolution, which does 
not work well in domestic violence situations because of the power imbalance and fear; and the court 
has complete discretion over whether to find the situation urgent and thereby take jurisdiction. 
 A third option is to add a new defense to the Hague Convention’s exceptions for victims of 
domestic violence. Weiner notes this possibility as the broadest proposal and pointed out several 
problems, including: lengthening what are supposed to be summary proceedings; requiring courts to 
explore facts normally reserved for a custody determination; the definition of domestic violence may 
be too narrow to encompass the full range of abuse suffered; adding a new domestic violence 
exception may spark additional exceptions; it may be unfair to consider this justification but not 
others; adding this defense requires a theoretical basis inconsistent with the convention, in that 
consistency would demand a determination on the merits to be in the country of habitual residence and 
this option may encourage more parental abductions; and opens the door to fraud (noting some of 
these concerns are legitimate while others may be easily addressed). 
 Finally, there is the option of suspending the summary return mechanism and allowing the victim 
to adjudicate the dispute on the merits in the country of their own habitual residence, essentially 
litigating in one country’s courts instead of another. The author favors this approach, finding the main 
disadvantages to be that some women should not be subject to the foreign court’s jurisdiction at all if 
they had been held there against their will, and that this option lengthens the time before a child is 
returned, if that is to happen at all. Id. 
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ends is undermining what is good about the Hague Convention with overly 
broad exceptions. It is imperative, however, that there is a balance in 
applying the strict standards established by the convention and 
accommodating cases where that procedure is clearly inappropriate. The 
prevalence of domestic violence and the severity of the associated 
consequences justifies an exception to the application of the summary 
return mechanism.  
There are various ways to effect that change within the framework of 
the convention. The one proposed here is to allow an exception for victims 
of domestic violence, fleeing internationally with their children, from the 
summary return mechanism. Procedurally, domestic violence would be 
evaluated in a hearing on whether the allegations were substantiated before 
the merits of the custody disagreement would be heard. This solution is 
appealing for several reasons. First and foremost, this proposal would 
protect victims of domestic violence from the additional pain and 
turbulence of having their children be subject to the summary return 
mechanism. Second, children would likely remain with their primary 
caretaker. Third, the convention would send a message of support to 
victims of domestic violence.  
The main foreseeable downfall of expanding the exceptions is that it 
may lessen the deterrent effect and the predictability that the convention 
arguably has. The other argument that some would proffer is the potential 
for claiming domestic violence when there in fact was not any. These 
concerns, however, are substantially outweighed by the international need 
to protect victims of domestic violence and their children. And this change 
would add only an additional narrow exception, not a gaping hole that 
would run the risk of enveloping the current convention. 
CONCLUSION 
The benefit of the summary return mechanism of the Hague 
Convention is its predictability. Being able to forecast the result can, in 
and of itself, be a deterrent to abduction. Certainly, the convention should 
remain intact as applied to non-primary caretaker abductors, toward whom 
the convention was originally directed. 
The difficulty is in incorporating sufficient flexibility into the 
convention so that the underlying goal of protecting children is realized in 
a variety of international parental abductions. The convention should 
remain just and effective; as such, some changes are needed to alleviate 
the disparate gender impacts of the convention. Two examples in which 
gender is highly correlated to unjust and unwise application of the 
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convention are career-based international relocation of families, and where 
international escape from domestic violence is involved. 
This Note first proposes that habitual residence should be evaluated 
based upon the child’s entire life, rather than the period immediately 
preceding the abduction. This proposal has multiple benefits in that it 
encourages families to relocate together; removes the disparate impact on 
stay-at-home parents; and is more likely to deem the child’s habitual 
residence as the place to which the child is most attached. The second 
proposal in this Note advocates adding an additional exception to the 
convention for those fleeing domestic violence. This proposal is especially 
appealing from a policy standpoint because it supports victims of domestic 
violence and renders their abusers powerless. 
These relatively minor changes would allow the Hague Convention to 
remain current while not undermining its original goals of reducing forum-
shopping, protecting the interests of both parents, and most importantly, 
reducing harm to children. 
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